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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
-~~-~----~-------------~---~--
CALLA E. JACKMAN, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
VSe 
DALE L .. JACKMAN, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
No. 18369 
-----------~-~-----~~-~-~~~--~ 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
-~~~~------~------------------
Appeal from Decree for Respondent 
Third District Court 
Honorable Jay E. Banks, Judge 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action in divorce that involves the 
allocation of assets acquired by the parties during the mar-
riage, alimony, support for the parties' son and attorney's 
fees. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The plaintiff-appellant, Calla E. Jackman, requested 
that the trial court award her an equitable share of the assets 
acquired by the parties during the marriage. That share, the 
plaintiff said, should consider the value of an interest the 
defendant had in a corporation called Future Development, Inc., 
1 
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and the value of the defendant's interests in two Bara proj-
ects, Bara Two Partnership Limited and Bara Industrial Park. 
The defendant did not disclose the existence of any interest 
in Future Development Company in the divorce proceedings, or 
admit an interest in any Bara project. The defendant denied 
that he had ever owned stock in the corporation, or any in-
terest in either of the partnerships. 
The trial court, the Honorable Jay E. Banks presid-
ing, dismissed the defendant-respondent's counterclaim and 
granted a divorce to the plaintiff. The court awarded an ap-
praisal business, Baseline Appraisal, and $13,500.00·in receiv-
ables, to the defendant-respondent, Dale L. Jackman. The court 
awarded the cash value of the life insurance, two vehicles and 
a motorcycle, a $10,000.00 money market certificate, with accumu-
lated interest, the IRA account, the parties $21,000.00 equity 
in a lot in Davis County (plaintiff's exhibit 6-P) and a 
$10,000.00 lien on the home to the defendant. The court awarded 
the plaintiff a 1979 Cutlass, the household furniture and fur-
nishings, the equity in the home, subject to.the defendant's 
$10,000.00 lien, $850.00 per month, as alimony, and $1,500.00 
against her attorney's fees. The plaintiff also received about 
$1,000.00 against her costs. No provision was made for the sup-
port of the parties' son, Steven Jackman, who was 18 years old 
at the time of the trial. The court awarded the plaintiff such 
interest, if any, as the defendant had in Future Development 
2 
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Company or in the Bara partnerships, but found, as a factual 
matter, that the defendant had no interest in the corporation, 
or in the Bara projectse The court concluded that there were 
no undisclosed assets and decided, at the end of the case, 
that the defendant had fairly testified about his holdings. 
The trial court determined that the defendant, a member of 
the American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers, an MAI ap-
praiser, had a net annual income of $19,600c00 (R.151) and a 
personal net worth of less than $100,000.00 (plaintiff's ex-
hibit 6-P, R.103-105). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The plaintiff asks this court to weigh the evidence, 
make its own findings, and substitute its judgment for that 
of the trial court. The plaintiff asks the court to award her 
one-half the proven value of the defendant's interest in Future 
Development Company, and in the Bara projects, at the time the 
case was filed, in cash or its equivalent. The plaintiff fur-
ther requests that the court equitably redistribute the assets 
previously divided in the Decree, and increase the alimony. 
In the alternative, the plaintiff requests that the court re~ 
mand the case to the trial calendar of the district court for 
such further proceedings as may be required. 
The plaintiff prays that this court determine a 
reasonable amount for attorney's fees, for the trial and this 
3 
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appeal, or, in the alternative, remand the case to the dis-
trict court for further proceedings in that regard. Finally, 
the plaintiff requests that this court order that further 
testimony be taken, in the lower court, on the issue of con-
tinuing support for the son, Steven Jackman. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff, who was married to the defendant on 
May 10, 1958, was fifty-seven years old when the case was 
tried (R.206). At the time of their marriage, the plaintiff 
and the defendant had six children, four of whom were the 
defendant Dale Jackman's, by a prior marriage, and two of whom 
were the plaintiff Calla Jackman's, by a prior marriage. The 
defendant's children ranged in age from 20 months to seven 
years. The plaintiff and the defendant had a seventh child, 
Steven Jackman, born to the two of them (R.207). 
Mrs. Jackman was a skilled stenographer and a private 
secretary; before the marriage, and was last employed as a 
detail draftsman for Kennecott Copper Corporation. The plain-
tiff gave up her employment, when the parties married, to 
assume the domestic burdens and care for the children. 
Mrs. Jackman was last employed in 1958 (R.212). She testified 
that the defendant had not wanted her to be employed, outside 
of the home, and had asked her to remain there (R.212,213). 
When the parties married, the defendant was employed 
as a mortgage loan officer and district manager for the 
4 
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Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company. Mr. Jackman was em-
ployed, as a mortgage loan officer, for more than 12 years 
(R.215). The defendant trained for and acquired his apprais-
ing skills, and became an MAI appraiser, during the marriage 
(R.213,214). By the time the case was tried, the defendant 
had been a Vice-President of Zion's Securities Corporation, 
the Corporation that built and now operates the ZCMI Mall, the 
President of Beneficial Development Compa~y, the President of 
the Salt Lake International Center Development Company {R.215) 
and, the plaintiff claimed, a director, vice-president, general 
manager, construction supervisor and employee of Future De-
velopment, Inc. 
The Plaintiff's Health 
............... 
The plaintiff's health, at the time of the trial, 
was very poor. Mrs. Jackman was hospitalized for a bowel re-
section in 1981 that delayed the trial. During the marriage to 
Mr. Jackman, the plaintiff had complications related to preg-
nancy, an atrophied kidney, multiple bladder infections and 
inflammation, colitis, asthma and arthritis. The plaintiff 
was traumatically injured, a number of times. Her elbow was 
broken skating. She suffered a pelvic fracture, because of a 
fall on the ice, and fell and broke her coccyx. A finger was 
accidentally broken and one of the falls necessitated a re-
pair for an inguinal hernia. One of the injuries, involving 
5 
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a spiral break of the right ring finger, was, the plaintiff 
testified, caused by the defendant, who twisted the finger dur-
ing an argument, until it snapped (R.218,219) . 1 The finger 
failed to properly heal and remained visibly misshapen and 
stiff when the case was tried (R.219}. 
, 
Since the marriage in 1958, the plaintiff has had a 
biopsy at St. Mark's Hospital and a tubal ligation. She has 
had two bladder repairs and a bladder polyps removed. She re-
quired a femoral hernia repair, and was hospitalized for prob-
lems related to phlebitis. The plaintiff had her gall bladder 
removed, in 1973, a hiatal hernia repair, a bilateral vagotomy 
and a pyloroplasty. Mrs. Jackman had tumors removed from her 
finger and a foot, and a hysterectomy. In 1980, in connection 
with a third bladder repair, her physicians removed her tubes 
and ovaries. Mrs. Jackman's health history is recapitulated in 
plaintiff's exhibit 3-P. 
From 1978 to 1980, a three year period, the parties 
incurred uncompensated medical expenses in the amount of 
$10,045.00, for an average, over what the insurance paid, of 
approximately $3,350.00 per year (plaintiff's exhibit 2-P}. 
At least 75% of those expenses were incurred for the plain-
tiff's uncompensated medical needs (R.229,230). The plaintiff 
1. The plaintiff was not without fault in the incident that 
resulted in the broken finger (R.218). 
6 
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testified that she needed $1,657.65 per month, to pay for 
her expenses and take care of her medical and other require-
ments (plaintiff's exhibit 1-P, R.240-248). 
The defendant, Dale Lo Jackman, was fifty-three 
years old (R.206), and in good health, when the case was 
tried. 
The Defendant's Income 
For the five year period that preceded the filing 
of the plaintiff's lawsuit, the period from 1975 to 1979, the 
defendant never earned less than $30,700.00, in any year. In 
1979, the year before the complaint was filed, the defendant 
earned $48,173.00. The defendant's claimed total earnings, 
from 1975 to 1979, as reflected on the parties' tax returns, 
were $195,096.21, for an average annual income of $39,019.00 
(plaintiff's exhibit 7-P). In the same five year period, the 
defendant showed an increase in earnings every year. In 1980, 
the year the plaintiff filed her lawsuit, the defendant claimed 
income of $32,971.00, more than $15,000.00 less than the pre-
vious year, on Baseline Appraisal Company's gross receipts of 
$60,387.00. The income reflected on the defendant's tax re-
turn, from Baseline Appraisal, was $22,323.00. The difference 
between that amount, reflected as business income, and the 
$32,971.00, reflected as total income, was a real estate commis-
sion paid to the defendant, a licensed real estate broker, and 
7 
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a premature IRA distribution (plaintiff's exhibit 7-P). On 
a loan application filed with Valley Bank and Trust Company, on 
August 7, 1979, after the defendant had terminated his employ-
ment with the Salt Lake International Center, and about a year 
before the divorce was filed, the defendant, who listed himself 
as self-employed, claimed an annual income of $50,000.00 
(plaintiff's exhibit 15-P). 
The defendant valued his business, Baseline Appraisal, 
2 
at $1,000.00 (R.105). The trial court ascribed no value to 
the.defendant's business, Baseline Appraisal, found that the 
defendant's net income, at the time of the trial, was $19,600.00 
(R.151), and awarded the plaintiff alimony of $850.00 per month. 
The Defendant's Testimony About Future Develop-
ment Company, Bara Two Partnership Limited 
and the Bara Industrial Park 
- - -- ------ ---
The defendant testified that he did not own, and had 
never owned, any interest in Future Development Company, a 
Utah corporation, in any Bara project, or in the Salt Lake In-
ternational Center. 
The defendant filed a Financial Declaration with 
the court, under oath, on February 4, 1981 (R.103) . 3 In that 
2. The business had more than $13,500.00 in receivables, and 
gross receipts, in 1980, of $60,387.00. 
3. The Financial Declaration filed with the Court provided as 
follows: "Any false statement made hereon shall subject you to 
the penalty for perjury and may be considered a fraud upon the 
court 11 (R .103) . 
8 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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declaration, the defendant claimed a personal net wort.:1 of: 
less than $100,000.00 (R.103). The defendant testifit3d th~.t 
all of his assets, of every kind, were disclosed in th~ Fina~­
cial Declaration, or in the Answers to InterrogatorieH ~ate:l 
January 29, 1981, which are found in the record at t:·c.~re 45 
(R. 260) . The Financial Declaration did not mention B i.~a J'~.·;o 
Partnership Limited, Bara Industrial Park, or Future ~E-.velop­
ment Company (R.267). Mr. Jackman testified that be hdd no 
interest in any real property that had not been prevlously dis-
closed, directly or indirectly, alone or with others (R.262,2f~), 
and no interest in any corporation (R.264). The def~~daLt sai = 
he had not engaged in any business enterprise during t!..e le.st 
five years of his marriage, excepting only Baseline l\.py 1:i:.a_: sal. 
The defendant testified that he had purch3se.d ~) 
stocks or bonds, in his own name, or that of any oth~~, a~ring 
the period of his marriage (R. 270, 271). He said he hall !!ut 
sold any stocks or bonds, during the last five years (R.~75) 
and that he didn't have, and had never had, any interest in a 
limited partnership (R.35,278). 
In his deposition, and later in his testinony at the 
trial (R.279), the defendant said he had tried to gGl into a 
company to build a building (R. 283), but that he had beE:!n t··ri.~ 
able to do so, because the money for the purchase ot the shd~~s 
was tied up in a Money Market Certificate. That ceitif~cat~, 
although held in Mr. Jackman's own name, belonged, h2 ~3i~. 
9 
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to both he and Mrs. Jackman, and was unavailable to him for 
the purchase of stock (R.280,281) . 4 Mr. Jackman testified he 
had no "track record 0 or prior experience as a builder (R.313). 
He testified that he had never been an employee of the com-
pany in which he had wanted to purchase shares, Future Devel-
opment Company, the company that was building the new build-
ing, and denied, under oath, that he was the construction 
supervisor of that company's building project in the North 
Salt Lake Industrial Park (R.310). The defendant testified 
that the Future Development Company principals handled their 
own building project, although he tried to get some preliminary 
design in the new building. "When it~ actually built," 
the defendant said, "I did hothing to it ... 11 {R.317,318). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DEFENDANT FAILED TO CORRECTLY STATE 
THE FACTS TO THE LOWER COURT AND THE 
TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS WERE IN ERROR 
The Defendant Earned His Interest in Future Development Company 
The defendant did not list Future Development Company 
as one of his present or past employers in the Answers to 
4. The same Money Market Certificate was cashed in and used 
by the defendant, Dale L. Jackman, during the pendency of the 
divorce proceedings, without Mrs. Jackman's consent (R.506). 
10 
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Interrogatories filed with the court on January 29, 1981 
(R.35). He was, however, the construction supervisor of 
Future Dev~lopment Company's project in the North Salt Lake 
Industrial Park and the company's general manager. The de~ 
fendant represented that he was the construction supervisor 
on September 6, 1979, in his own hand, before this lawsuit 
was filed (plaintiff's exhibits 12-P, 26-P). The defendant 
also represented, again in his own hand, that he was the gen-
eral manager of Future Development Company (plaintiff's ex-
hibit 28-P). The defendant was the only employee Future Devel-
opment Company had on April 10, 1980 (plaintiff's exhibit 13-P, 
page 3). The manager of the Group Department at Traveler's 
Insurance Company testified that Dale Jackman was the only em-
ployee ever listed for group insurance, under Future Develo~ment 
Company's Plan, from September 6, 1979, the day the Group In-
surance Record card was signed, to November 13, 1981, the sec-
ond day of the trial (R.410). Based on the representation that 
he was an employee of Future Development Company, the defendant 
collected thousands of dollars from Traveler's Insurance Com-
pany, under Future Development Company's/Group Policy. Most 
of those funds were used for the medical care required by 
Mrs. Jackman. All of that notwithstanding, the defendant de-
nied, under oath, in his testimony at the trial, and always be-
fore, that he had ever been an employee or construction super-
visor for Future Development Company. 
11 
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The defendant acquired the land for Future Develop-
ment Company's North Salt Lake Project from Beneficial Develop-
ment Company, which he had served as president. He then han-
dled an exchange for more suitable land, for the.tract that 
Future Development then used for the Industrial Park Project 
(R.478, 479) . The defendant helped to design the bu.ilding and 
worked with the architects. When Mr. Wimer, who serviced the 
loan, had a problem that concerned the architects he contacted 
Mr. Jackman (R.420). The load bearing capacity of the soil was 
tested, at Mr. Jackman's request, and the consulting engineer 
reported to him (plaintiff's exhibit 19-P). The defendant 
brought Future Development's other principals, Mr. Martin and 
Mr. Gregson, to Bettilyon Mortgage Loan, where the loan for 
the project was arranged, and introduced them to Mr. Wimer, who 
had not known them before (R.415,416). The defendant applied 
for the construction loan, as general manager for Future Develop-
ment Company (plaintiff's exhibit 28-P), and furnished Bettilyon 
Mortgage Loan with information that it then furnished to the 
lender, Old Stone Bank in Providence, Rhode Island (R.422-424). 
The defendant signed the Construction Agreement, between the 
owner and the contractor, for Future Development Company, on 
January 31, 1980 (plaintiff's exhibit 38-P), and personally 
guaranteed the construction loan, in the amount of $285,000.00, 
on March 3, 1980 (plaintiff's exhibit 29-P). The defendant 
12 
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Jackman approved and accepted the mortgage loan commitment for 
the corporation (plaintiff's exhibit 27-P). 
The defendant approved and paid the bills on the 
project (plaintiff's exhibit 24-P). He signed and authorized 
all of the change orders (plaintiff's exhibit 22-P) and the 
contractor accounted to him (plaintiff's exhibit 23-P). When 
the contractor needed authority to locate a transformer, he 
contacted.the defendant (plaintiff's exhibit 29-P). When cor-
respondence was required, it went to the defendant (defendant's 
exhibit 41-D). 
The closing documents were sent to the defendant 
(plaintiff's exhibit 37-P), and he received the Certificate of 
Occupancy from the City of North Salt Lake (plaintiff's 
exhibit 40-P) • 
The defendant was the person authorized to lease the 
property (plaintiff's exhibit 18-P). Mr. Jackman leased the 
newly constructed building, on a long term lease, for 
$1,407,900.00. He handled the amendments to the lease (plain-
tiff's exhibit 55-P) and the Subordination Ag~eement (plain-
tiff's exhibit 56-P). 
on January 21, 1981, the defendant argued with the 
lender about the interest charged on the completed project 
(plaintiff's exhibit 20-P). on January 27, 1981, two days 
before the defendant signed the Answers to Interrogatories, 
under oath (R.35), and less than one week before the defendant 
13 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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signed the sworn Financial Declaration he filed with the 
court (R.103), the defendant personally guaranteed the per-
manent loan on Future Development Company's North Salt Lake 
5 Project in the amount of $285,000.00. The defendant's 
guarantee of the permanent loan followed the completion ·of 
the construction of the project, and the issuance of a cer-
·tificate of occupancy on August 29, 1980, by at least five 
months, and occtirred long after the final bills were paid. 
In addition to that, the defendant managed and collected the 
rent for 80 storage units owned by Future Development Company 
in the City of Bountiful (R.379. See plaintiff's exhibit 
35-P, item 5). 
The defendant was.fully engaged by Future Develop-
ment Company from the time he applied for the construction 
loan, some time in 1979, until he personally guaranteed the 
permanent loan on January 27, 1981, after the divorce was filed. 
The preceding facts must be read with an eye on the representa-
tions made in defendant's Answers to Interrogatories, in his 
deposition, and at the trial. But for Baseline Appraisal, the 
defendant said, he had not been involved in any business enter-
prise, alone or with others, for the last five years of his 
5. The loan the defendant guaranteed on January 27, 1981, 
was more than three times larger than the net worth he 
claimed on his Financial Declaration dated February 3, 1981 
(R.103). 
14 
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marriage (See, as representative, R.44, Answer to Interrogatory 
number 39). 
The defendant testified that he received no compensa-
tion for his work for Future Development Company~ only "a 
lot of exercisen (R.309). For the· services just described, the 
defendant reflected.no incQme, of any kind, on his tax returns 
for the years 1978, 1979 an~ 1980, and no income in 1981, to 
the date of the trial (R.305-307). 
The defendant was Future Development Company's realtor6 
a director of the corporation, its appraiser, developer, gen-
era! manager and construction supervisor. He was the corpora-
tion's experienced loan officer and architect in residence, its 
leasing agent, its executive vice-president and only employee. 
Dale Jackman earned the one-third interest in Future Development 
Company that we shall later see he told Valley Bank he owned. 6 
The Defendant Acquired Interests in Two Bara Projects 
The defendant testified he had never been in a 
limited partnership, and said he had never terminated 2.£ dis-
continued any business arrangements (R.44,45,326). 
6. Mr. Jackman's associate, Gordon S. Gregson, valued his 
own one-third interest in Future Development Company at 
$120,000.00 on July 31, 1980. (Statement of Financial Condi-
tion, Gordon s. Gregson, July 31, 1980, plaintiff's exhibit 
33-P). 
15 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The plaintiff's Complaint was filed on October 8, 
1980. The plaintiff's Interrogatories were answered by the 
defendant on January 29, 1981 (R.33), and were filed, with 
the court, the following day. The defendant's Financial Dec-
laration was prepared on February 3, 1981, and filed on Febru-
ary 4 (R.103). The documents filed by the defendant did not 
mention Future Development Company, Bara Two Partnership Lim-
ited or the Bara Industrial Park. Mr. Jackman mentioned an 
apprentice appraiser (R.324), an Iraqi National named Nazih 
Mahmood (R.323), in his deposition, but did not mention any -
"agreementsu with Mr. Mahmood, or any interest in any Bara 
project. Mr. Mahmood, it was later discovered, was the mana-
gerial person for as many as ten Bara corporations and ten 
Bara limited partnerships involved in projects in the Salt 
Lake Valley, or the State of Utah (R.324). 
On August 25, 1981, more than ten months after the 
lawsuit was filed, after the Interrogatories were answered, 
the depositions taken, and long after the Financial Declara-
tion was submitted to the court, the defendant's counsel sent 
a letter and two agreements, plaintiff's proposed exhibit 9-P 
and plaintiff's exhibits 10-P and 11-P, to plaintiff's counsel. 
The defendant's attorney indicated that Mr. Jackman had pre-
viously testified that he had agreements with Mr. Nazih Mahmood 
16 
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that were not in writinq (R.355).7 Mr. Dolowitz indicated 
that the defendant had now spoken with Mr. Mahmood, and had 
determined that such agreements had been put in wr~ting, al-
though the defendant, who had signed them both, had not re-
membered that (R.337,338). It was further asserted, at the 
trial, that. Mr. Mahmood, who did not testify, and Mr. Jackman, 
considered the written agreements between Mr. Jackman and 
Bara Two Partnership Limited and Bara Industrial Park to be 
terminated or abrogated (R.339). 
The Bara Agreements, exhibits 10-P and 11-P, fur-
nished ten months after the lawsuit was filed, came only seven 
days after plaintiff's counsel filed a Request for Production 
of Documents (R.128) and Interrogatories (R.134). The Inter-
rogatories required the defendant to furnish information per-
taining to the defendant's involvement with specific Bara 
.projects (R.134,135). 
The trial court refused to admit Mr. Dolowitz' cover 
letter, which is contained with the transcript on appeal as 
plaintiff 1s· proposed exhibit 9-P. The defendant's attorney 
stipulated to the admission of the exhibit, but the court re-
fused to allow it (R.338). It would be easier to exp~ain what 
7. A careful examination of Dale Jackman's deposition shows 
that the defendant made no such representations about Mr. Mahmood 
or any Bara project. 
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occurred here, if the court had not sustained its own objec-
tion to the proposed exhibit, or if plaintiff's counsel had 
followed through and insisted upon the proffer of proof coun-
sel requested that the court permit him to make (R.339). In 
any event, the failure to admit the cover letter that accompa-
nied the tardy submission of the two exhibits, 10-P and 11-P~ 
and that contained. an explanation that conflicted with the 
testimony of the defendant, at ·the trial, was legal error. 
Some of the facts contained in the omitted exhibit, those re-
ferred to in this section, are found in the record, beginning 
at page 333. 
Bara I 
---
Plaintiff's exhibit 10-P is the first of two agree-
ments. It is between. BARA TWO, N.V., a Netherlands Antilles 
corporation (the "Corporation"), BARA TW"O PARTNERSHIP LIMITED, 
a Utah limited partnership (the Partnership") and Dale L. 
Jackman. The agreement reflects the entire understanding of 
the parties and may only be modified by an agreement in writ-
ing. It is ·dated July 1, 1980, and is seven pages long. It 
was prepared by Mr. Dolowitz' law firm and is signed by all of 
the parties, in the case of the Bara ucorporation 11 and· "Partnership," 
by Nazih M. Mahmood, as managing director of BARA TWO, N.V., 
the "Corporation 11 and "General Partner." 
18 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The agreement notes that Jaclanan has rendered serv-
8 
ices to the partnership worth $40,000.00, in connection with 
its acquisition of certain unimproved real property in Davis 
County. Mr. Jackman ~oaned the money back to the partnership, 
and received, in lieu-of interest on the loan, an assignment 
of 4% of the net profits. The defendant was not required to 
make any contributions to the capital of the corporation, but 
did agree to be available, in consideration of the interest 
assigned to him, "for consultation.fl In consideration of the 
11 rightsu created by the contract, in his 11 favor,n Dale Jack-
man released all claims he had, "for any compensation or com-
mission, 11 as a result of the services rendered in connection 
with the partnership's acquisition of the real property, or. 
for uadditional servicesn which Jackman "may .. render, in the 
future. 
Bara ll 
Plaintiff's exhibit 11-P is the second of two agree-
ments. It is between BARA CENTENNIAL PARK, N.V., a Nether-
lands Antilles corporation (the "Corporation 11 ), BARA INDUS-
TRIAL PARK, a Utah limited partnership {the npartnershipu) and 
Dale L. Jackman. The agreement reflects the entire understanding 
of the parties and can only be modified by an agreement in 
a. The original figure was later changed to $20,000.00 and 
initialled by both parties. 
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writing. It is also dated July 1, 1980, and is seven pages 
long. It was prepared by Mr. Dolowitz' law firm and is signed 
by all of the parties, in the case of the Bara °CorporationJ• 
and 11Partnership, 11 by Mr. Jackman's friend and associate, 
Nazih M. Mahmood, as Managing Director of BARA CENTENNIAL 
PARK, N.V., the 11Corporation" and 11General Partner." 
The agreement provides that Jackman has rendered 
services to the partnership, Bara Industrial Park, worth 
$45,000.00 in connection with its acquisition of ~ertain unim-
proved real property in Salt Lake County. The defendant, Jack-
man, loaned the money back to the partnership, and received, 
in lieu of interest on the loan, an assignment of 2.574%· of the 
net profits of Bara Industrial Park. Jackman was not required 
to make any capital contribution to the partnership, and his 
loan was not treated as a capital contribution. Jackman did 
agree, again, to be available, in consideration of the interest 
assigned to.him, from time to time, 11 for consultation." In 
consideration of the "rights" created by the contract in his 
"favor," Jackman released all claims 11 for any compensation 11 or 
commission, connected with the partnership's acquisition of the 
property for its Industrial Park, or for "additional 11 or 
"future" services. 
The Defendant Earned the Interests the Bara 
Contracts Said He Owned 
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The defendant admitted that he had dealings during 
the year 1980 with the Bara Corporation (R.321,322). He 
stated, at first, that he spent ,.practi9ally no time" working 
fo~ them (R.322), but later admitted that he tried to put a 
deal together; that he chased back and forth·and handled nego-
tiations for the purchase of some property at Patio Springs 
in Ogden. For his services, he conceded he was qoinq to re-
ceive an interest. in a Bara project from Nazih Mahmood (R.322)e 
The defendant denied that he rendered any services to the Bara 
companies in connection with the acquisition of unimproved 
real property in Davis County (R.328). 9 
no. (By Mr. Allred) ••• Did you acquire un-
improved real property in Davis County 
for the Bara Corporation? 
A. I did not acquire unimproved property 
for the Bara Corporation. 
Q. Did you render services for the Bara 
. h lO t• "th Corporation for t e connec ion wi 
the acquisition of the unimproved 
property in Davis County? 
A. I did not. 
9. Although that is precisely what exhibit 10-P says that 
he did. 
10. The record here should say, •• ... in connection with ••• " 
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Q. Did you acquire real property for the 
Bara Corporation in Salt Lake County? 
A. I did not acquire real property or any 
other property 11 (R.330). 
The defendant did testify that he may have served 
the Bara people by referring them to Zions Securities Cor-
poration, where they acquired some unimproved real property 
in Salt Lake County, but denied that his services had value, 
or that he had done anything. Zions Securities ndid it all, ... 
he said. The defendant claimed that the transaction, closed 
months before th~ agreement, exhibit 11-P, was signed. 11 ••• I 
really didn't do anything, no service was rendered .. (R.341). 
On redirect, on the second day of the trial, the 
defendant admitted, for the first time ever, that the Bara 
Corporation purchased 16 acres of property in the North Salt 
11 Lake Industrial Park for at least $28,000.00 an acre. The 
acquisition involved a purchase price of $450,000.00 to 
$480,000.00, and the property was purchased from Beneficial 
Development Comp~ny (R.397). 
The Bara Corporation did purchase unimproved real 
property in Davis County as exhibit 10-P said that it did. 
The Bara Corporation also purchased unimproved real property 
11. Future Development Company's new building is located in 
the same industrial park (R.397). 
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in Salt Lake County as exhibit 11-P stated (R.398). Mr. Jack-
man testified that he had never told anyone that he owned or 
had an interest in either of those Bara projects, the one in 
Salt Lake County, or the one in Davis County, but. admitted 
that he 11might have led" someone to believe that he did 
(R.398). 
Hoyt Wimer, the Assistant Vice-President of Surety 
Life Insurance Company,·who previously worked at Bettilyon 
Mortgage Loan, a friend of the defendant, one thoroughly fa-
miliar with the Future Development Company project, and the 
man who arranged for Future Development's loan, contradicte~ 
the claim that the defendant had no interest in Bara's North 
Salt Lake project •. Mr. Wimer testified that the Bara Corpora-
tion acquired 30 acres of property in the North Salt Lake In-
dustrial Park for $30,000.00 an acre (R.421). He admitted 
that he had written a letter to Future Development Company's 
prospective-lender, Old Stone Bank, on November 16, 1979, and 
had informed the lender that the Bara property in the North Salt 
Lake Industrial Park was being developed with the aid and help 
of Dale Jackman, who had ~ interest in the project (R.421) •. 
Mr. Wimer testified that Mr. Jackman told him, as he ~hen told 
the prospective lender, that Jackman had an interest in the 
Bara project at the North Salt Lake Industrial Center (R.422) • 
The witness Wimer, a witness hostile to the plaintiff, conceded 
that parts of the Bara project in the North Salt Lake Industrial 
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Park were being patterned after the Salt Lake International 
Center (R.422). The letter to the lender, Old Stone Bank, the 
one prepared by Mr. Wimer before this case was filed, is 
plaintiff's exhibit 30-P. Following the testimony of Mr. Wimer, 
on those points, the court interrupted proceedings to say that 
the plaintiff may have shown that the defendant lied, and 
asked if it made any difference (R.425).12 
The Bara companies purchased unimproved real estate 
from two of Mr. Jackman's former employers, Beneficial Devel-
opment Company and Zions Securities Corporation. The Bara 
people developed their project in the North Salt Lake Industrial 
Park, with the assistance of Mr. Jackman, who shared an office 
with Nazih Mahmood, following principles previously tested at 
the Salt Lake International Center by the Salt Lake Interna-
tional Center Development Company. 
The Contracts, exhibits 10-P and 11-P, define what 
Mr. Jackman owned, when the case was filed. It was manifestly 
unjust for the trial judge, at the trial, to completely dis-
regard those documents, as if they did not exist. The agree-
ments which were executed with all requisite formalities are 
valid on their face. 
12. See this Brief, section IV , for further discussion of 
the point. 
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Exhibits 10-P and 11-P purport to increase the 
defendant's alleged net worth almost once again. The claim 
that Mr. Jackman did not remember that the Bara agreements 
were in writing, or that he had ever signed them (R.336), was 
the only way the defendant could explain why such arrange-
ments had not previously been disclosed, in the course of pro-
ceedings, in the Answers to Interrogatories (R •. 35), the Fi-
nancial Declaration (R.103) or the defendant's deposition. 
The claim that Mr. Jackman.did not remember the 
existence of contracts that were legally binding and signed by 
him, documents that.purported to compensate him for services 
he contributed on projects Mr. Wimer said he helped to develop, 
contracts with Nazih Mahmood, with whom he shared-an office, is 
preposterous. At the time this case commenced, the defendant, 
Dale L. Jackman, owned the interests in the Bara projects that 
the two unrefuted contracts, exhibits 10-P and 11-P, said that 
he did. 
The trial court erred when it found that the defendant 
had no interest in Future Development Company, Bara Two Part-
nership Limited or the Bara Industrial Park. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT PERMIT PLAINTIFF'S 
COUNSEL TO PRESENT THE PLAINTIFF'S CASE 
This case was given a special setting on the trial 
calendar and the plaintiff waited more than a year to have 
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the matter heard. The plaintiff was no~ familiar with the 
defendant's tangled financial affairs. It fell to her attor-
ney to examine hundreds of documents, and the witnesses who 
were familiar with them, the defendant and his business asso-
ciates. Plaintiff's counsel informed the court, at the outset 
of the trial, that the plaintiff would prove her case "with 
the testimony of hostile witnesses 11 (R.204). 
The defendant's attorney alleged, before the trial 
began, in the Judge's chambers, as his client had previously 
done, under oath, that Mr. Jackman did not own, and had never 
owned, any interest in Future Development ~ompany, or in any 
Bara project. He offered the plaintiff, both on and off the 
record, any interest his client then had in Future Development 
Company, in any Bara project, or in the Salt Lake International 
Center. Mr. Dolowitz agreed to give those interests to the 
plaintiff, in their ent~rety, and to ascribe no value to them 
(R.191). 
The plaintiff's attorney agreed that Mrs. Jackman 
would accept the proposition that the defendant had never 
owned an interest in any Bara project, or in Future Develop-
ment Company, if the defendant would take a polygraph ~est on 
those points, one that could be administered on the eve of the 
first day of trial, and reported at the morning session the 
following day. The plaintiff's attorney had prearranged such 
a test and had informed the court that the plaintiff would 
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find some way to bear the cost. Part of that discussion, 
between counsel and.,the court, spilled over on the record at 
the beginning of the triai. 13 
Before the trial commenced, the situation, then, was 
as follows: The defendant claimed he had never owned any in-
terest in Future Development Company, or in any Bara project, 
and offered to give the plaintiff any interes·t he then had. 
His attorney argued that because Mr. Jackman had made such a 
tender, and generously agreed to give such interests no value 
in his proposal for settlement, that all testimony on those 
issues should be excluded from the trial on grounds of rele-
vance {R.191). 
The plaintiff's position was that the defendant owned 
an interest in Future Development Company worth $160,000.00 
at the time the case was filed. The plaintiff claimed the 
defendant owned interests in Bara projects worth at least 
$65,000.00, without considering the projected annual revenue. 
The plaintiff did not want an in-kind share of such interest 
as Mr. Jackman then had in either Bara project, or in Future 
Development Company. It was apparent that the defendant had 
13. "The proposal really, basically, is this, your Honor. If 
Mr. Jackman would take the polygraph test, and if he can pass 
the test, we will accept his disclosure of the assets as the 
record reflects them, and then the issues that remain to be 
decided by the court are how should those assets that he has 
disclosed be divided as between these parties..... (R.190. See 
also: 189-191) • 
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no interest that would benefit the plaintiff, in any of 
those entities, when the case was tried. The defendant's 
"concessionn (R.191) was a cynical one, intended to foreclose 
any proof about the existence or value of such interests. 
The plaintiff asked the trial court to award her, in cash or 
its equivalent, one-half the value of the interest the defend-
ant had in the Bara projects, and in Future Development Com-
pany, at the time the case was filed, or just before (R.193,194). 
From the moment the plaintiff refused to accep~ the 
defendant's tender, before the court had examined an exhibit, 
or heard from a single witness, until the conclusion of the 
foreshortened trial, the plaintiff paid a stiff price for re-
fusing to settle the case on the defendant's terms.· The issue 
was raised again and again, 
and, 
and, 
"THE COURT:. He says if you've got any 
interest you £2,£ have all o.f it. You 
want hal.f o.f. it. What more £2,£ !. give 
you than all of it?" (R.190, emphasis 
supplied.) 
"THE COURT: Frankly !. can't ~the rele-
vancy of all of this. 
ltMR. ALLRED: You can't see the relevance 
of these documents? 
"THE COURT: If. he's. got !!!. interest in it, 
why,.yo.u're going to get it. They said you 
can have it" (R.476, emphasis supplied). 
"THE COURT: Well, the only asset you've got 
here is the house and a lot, isn't it? 
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11MR. ALLRED: No. 
,..THE COURT:. . Wel.l.,. ~- yo~' .v.e .got anything 
else they said you can have iJ:.. So, the 
burden is on you to prove by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that he's got it. 
"MR. ALLRED: ••• I think we've proved by 
a preponderance of the proof that he has 
got it. 
11
.TBE. .. Co.tJRT._.:. -· .AlL .right. .And .tbey said if . 
th.er.a .~ .that .. aw.ar.d !.!:.· .. all. .j:g .. the plaintiff. 
That's exactly what they've said.Jt Ca.426, 
emphasis supplied) 
See also: R.313, lines 7 through 13. 
In a clumsy effort to coerce a settlement in a case 
the court did not wish to try, the trial court required plain-
tiff's reluctant counsel to make a proffer of proof, before 
any testimony was permitted to be taken. In that proffer, 
counsel was forced to divulge, giving the defendant full fore-
warning, 14 how the plaintiff intended to prove the defendant 
owned stock in Future Development Company. The dilemma of 
plaintiff's counsel, already on the defense, and the attitude 
of the trial court, before a witness had spoken a word, is 
reflected in the following dialogue: 
1'THE COURT: Let me put it--what' s your 
proffer of proof contrary to that? 
Who are you going to call to testify 
other than that? 
14. The full fruits of that improvident disclosure are seen 
in the defendant's evasive testimony beginning at line 24, 
R. at 271, and ending on page 276 at line 25. 
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11MR. ALLRED: ••• !_ hesitate E2_ say ~, 
as I hes,ita.ted to say at the,. pretrial, 
how ~ intend to make ~ proof. 
"THE COURT: .. You.' re before the court ~­
Make your proffer. 
"MR •. ALLRED.:. .I. intend E2_ pro.ve that Mr .• 
Jackman owned 2n!_-thir.d .of Future Develop-
ment Company from ~ financ.ial. s.ta.tement 
writ.ten in his ~ hand given to ~bank in 
connection with ~ loan for credit. 
"THE COURT: All right. What else do you 
have? 
"MR. ALLRED: I have a mountain of evidence, 
your Honor, with respect to his dealings 
with that corporation, the responsibilities 
he had that he performed for them, how he 
earned that enti.tlement .. I hate to disclose 
that, because it gives them two da¥s ..... 1s 
"THE COURT: ll doesn't give them two days. 
~.don't have two days. comence your case. 11 
(R.192, emphasis supplied.) 
The trial commenced on Thursday, November 12, 1981, 
at approximately 10:30 a.m. 17 The trial court was reluctant 
to permit plaintiff's counsel to make an opening statement 
(R.194). The Judge returned late on Thursday afternoon, and 
15.. I have taken the liberty to correct th~ record, which 
was inaccurate at this point. I have substituted the word 
"hate" for the word "had", and I have indicated the inter-
ruption with ellipsis periods. 
16. See in that same regard, lines 9 through 17, R. at 194, 
lines 19 through 25 and lines 1 and 2, R. at 257 and 258. 
17. Contrary to the assertion in the record that this case 
started at 10:00 a.m. The court had an early calendar. 
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the trial did not conunence on time. 18 Plaintiff's counsel 
was advised, on the first trial day that the case was to be 
entirely completed by 3:30 p.m. the following day, whether 
th t . f. . h d 19 e par ies were inis e or not. 
The court attempted to dispose of the unwanted case 
on-jurisdictional grounds. It said, 11 .0.you establish juris-
diction in this case or we're going to dispose of this in a 
hurry." (R. 254) 
The plaintiff was not permitted sufficient time to 
interrogate the witnesses. Plaintiff's counsel spent the 
short second trial day identifying and admitting the exhibits 
required to support the plaintiff's claim and this appeal. 
Proof of that is found in the fact that the critically impor-
tant deposition of Gordon Gregson was not published at the 
trial. Plaintiff's counsel simply set aside all the careful 
preparations that were made for the examination of Mr. Jackman's 
associate, Mr. Gregson, an essential witness and a principal 
in Future Development Company. It was necessary to do the 
same with other equally important preparations, including those 
18. Contrary to the assertion in the record that court re-
commenced at 2:00 p.m. 
19. See R. at page 478, lines 1 through 5. The testimony 
concluded at 3:30 p.m. on Friday, November 13, 1981 (R.497), 
and counsel and the parties went home early, without arguing 
the matter. See.also: R. at 533. 
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f Mr W. 20 or • imer. The trial court scheduled closing arguments 
for Tuesday, November 17, 1981, before 10:00 a.m., so they 
would not conflict with that day's agenda. 
The trial judge interfered with the presentation of 
the plaintiff's case. That interference constituted a denial 
. 
of -due process and was prejudicial error. Failure to consider 
the pertinent facts is itself an abuse of discretion. Kallas v. 
Kallas, Utah, 614 P.2d 641 (1980). 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REQUIRING THE 
PLAINTIFF TO COLLECT HER MARITAL ESTATE 
FROM THIRD PARTIES 
The plaintiff_ proved that the defendant owned~­
third of the stock in Future Development Company. The defend-
ant testified, before the trial, that he had not prepared any 
statements reflecting income, expenses, assets, liabilities or 
net worth (R.49, number 44, deposition, April 22, 1981, at 
561 and 567.} Those sworn representations by a man who had 
been a mortgage loan officer for more than twelve years, later 
proved not to be true. The plaintiff subpoenaed the defendant's 
financial records from Valley Bank and Trust Company.. Those 
records, produced after the defendant's deposition was taken, 
20. Mr. Wimer's shortened testimony is found at R.413. 
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and after he had answered the defendant's Interrogatories, 
included a Credit Application and Personal Financial Statement, 
found here as plaintiff's exhibit 15-P. 21 
On exhibit 15-P, on July 25 and August 7, 1979, 
approximately one year before the plaintiff's complaint was 
filed, the defendant, who identified himself as a self-employed 
real estate appraiser and 11developer,.., represented to Valley 
Bank, in order to acquire a $16,000.00 loan for the purchase 
of real estate, that he owned one-third of the stock in Future 
Development Company, and had an annual income of $50,000.00. 
The Credit Application and the Personal Financial Statement 
incorporated there, by reference, were prepared by the defend-
ant in his own hand (R.36i,362). 
The plaintiff proved that the vaiue of the defend-
ant's stock in Future Development Company was $160,000.00. 
On December 1, 1980, less than two months after this case was 
filed, the defendant prepared a Financial Statement for Future 
Development Company. That Financial Statement is found in ~he 
record as plaintiff's exhibit 35-P. For all intents and 
21. The defendant's signature on these documents follows 
this language: 
"! ... fully understand that it is a federal 
crime punishable by fine or imprisonment 
or both to knowingly make any false state-
ments concerning any of the above facts, as 
applicable under the provisions of Title 18, 
United States Code, Section 1014.u 
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purposes, all of the assets of Future Development Company 
consisted of real estate. The value of that real estate was 
determined, on a statement certified as true, by the same 
skilled M.A.I. appraiser who valued Antelope Island for its 
owners, by the defendant, Dale L. Jackman. The defendant 
prepared exhibit 35-P, Future Development Company's Financial 
Statement, as the Vice-President of the corporation. 
Future Development Company's Financial Statement 
was prepared for Bettilyon Mortgage Loan. It reflected assets 
of $1,068,000.00, liabilities of $590,000.00, and a net worth 
of $478,800.00. Mr. Jackman's one-third of the stock had a 
value of $159,600.00 on December 1, 1980. 
The trial court held that if the defendant had any 
interest in Future Development Company, or in any Bara project, 
the plaintiff could .. enforce" it. If the defendant were ever 
to receive anything from any of those entities,_the judge con-
cluded that the plaintiff could come back in and ask for an 
increase in alimony "based on change of position ... " uwhy, 
you can proceed directly against those entities, and that's 
about what it boils down to'' (R.526,527. See· also: R.425-427). 
In effect the court informed the impoverished plain-
tiff she could litigate with the Bara principals, or Future 
Development Company, if she thought they controlled assets 
that belonged to the marital estate. The plaintiff was not in-
volved in the arrangements between her husband and his business 
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11 22 d . . t. co eagues, an was in no posi ion to prove Mr. Jackman's 
present interest in those projects, against his will, in liti-
23 
gation with his friends. Any claim made by the plaintiff 
had to be asserted without personal knowledge of the facts, 
or the defendant's assistance, in the face of the defendant's 
sworn denial he had ever owned an interest in any of the proj-
ects in question. To prove her interest in those ancillary 
proceedings, Mrs. Jackman would have had to ·first prove her 
husband's perjury. 
The trial court erred in requiring the plaintiff to 
collect her marital estate from third parties. That burden 
belonged to the defendant, who controlled the arrangements, 
bargained for the benefits, in the first place, and provided 
the services that produced them. 
A divorce court authorized to make a division of the 
property, or to recognize one spouse's title or equitable 
rights in property held by the other, may award the property 
to one spouse and order that that spouse pay the other a sum 
in cash. That is particularly true where a transfer in kind 
22. The wives of the other principals were involved. The 
five permanent guarantors of the $285,000.00 loan, under the 
G.uar.anty· dated. January 27, 1981, were. Robert J •. ~.tin.,. 
Miriam E. Martin, Gordon s. Gregson, Betty Jane Gregson and 
Dale L.-Jackman (plaintiff's exhibit 36-P, pages 5 and 6). 
23. Mr. Mahmood could not be served or deposed in these pro-
ceedings (R.483) • 
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is impractical, or does not bring about a fair and equitable 
result. The plaintiff has no way of knowing what arrange-
ments the defendant made with respect to his stock in Future 
Development Company, or regarding his interests in_ the Bara 
projects, or how he now intends to receive those assets. The 
24 defendant knows. 
If a defendant sells, transfers, or conceals an 
asset that belongs to both parties, during the pendency of 
divorce proceedings, and does not share the proceeds, the 
trial court may require payment in cash, or an adjustment of 
properties, in any final settlement. Persons guilty of such 
conduct would remain fully liable to any party whose interest 
was adversely affected. 
The plaintiff asked the court to award her one-half 
the value of the assets described at the trial, in cash. 
Where the principal assets were shares of stock in corporations, 
or percentage interests in limited partnerships, the success 
24. In Boyce v. Boyce, Utah 609 P.2d 928 (1980), the defend-
ant represented to the plaintiff that his net worth was ap-
proximately $200,000.00 arid the plaintiff relied on those fig-
ures when she agreed to settle for $100,000.00. After the 
parties settled, the defendant gave substantially different 
information on a loan application where he claimed a net worth 
of $1,154,690.10. The defendant included the assets of cor-
porations he had previously transferred to his parents, and in 
which he previously indicated, he had no stock. This court 
reversed the trial court and remanded the case for reconsidera-
tion. In the Boyce case,· it appeared that the defendant's 
parents held the stock, for him, until the case was settled. 
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of which were in some degree attributable to the defendant's 
continued management, 25 the actual assets, the shares of stock 
and the partnership percentages, should have been awarded to 
the husband, with the wife receiving her share in cash. 
The trial court erred when it required the plaintiff 
to collect her marital estate from· third parties. Further-
more, the property settlement was, in other respects, inequi-
table. 26 The court failed to discharge its duty in the matter 
of making a fair division of the property. The apportionment 
of the property was so manifestly unjust as to indicate a clear 
abuse of discre~ion. Turner v. Turner, Utah, 649 P.2d 6 (1982). 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT MISUNDERSTOOD AND MIS-
APPLIED THE LAW 
During the course of the trial, the judge indicated, 
in a number of important respects, that his understanding of 
the law did not accord with the recent decisions of this court, 
and with the laws. and statutes of the State of Utah. When 
there has been a misunderstanding or misapplication o~ the law, 
resulting in prejudicial error, and when the ends of justice 
require it to do so, this court may review the evidence, make 
\ 
25. See paragraphs 7, plaintiff's exhibits 10-P and 11-P. 
26. The court awarded the defendant a $10,000.00 lien, against 
the home, and the entire equity in the lot in Davis County. 
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its own findings and substitute its judgment for that of the 
trial court. Harding v. Harding 26 Utah 2d 277, 488 P.2d 277. 
See also: Mitchell v. Mitchell, Utah, 527 P.2d 1359 (1974). 
The trial court failed to correctly interpret or 
apply the law in the following particulars: 
Child Support 
Before the trial began, before the matter was ever 
discussed, before the first witness testified or an opening 
statement was made, the court ruled as follows: 
"THE COURT: .•. The issue of the child is 
out. I don't know whether you've told your 
client or not, but he has attained majority. 
Any right to support is his and not yours 
in absence of mental incapacity. So you 
don't have to worry about child support in 
this case .. (R.194). 
The parties' son, Steven Jackman, then 18 years of 
age, had a physical rather than mental incapacity. The trial 
court cut short and refused to permit testimony pertaining 
to Steven Jackman's physical incapacity, although Mrs. Jackman 
did testify that he suffered from dyslexia and Crohn's disease 
(R.239) and-required special medications (R.229). The record 
does not reflect the details of Steven Jackman's incapacity, 
or spell out his need for special care. The court refused to 
permit any testimony about Steven Jackman's ability to support 
himself (R.239). 
Those rulings, consistent with the trial court's 
persistent efforts to foreshorten the trial, did not correctly 
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• 
interpret or apply the law, and were in error. Section 
15-2-1 u.c.A. does not limit the right of child support after 
the age of 18 to cases of mental incapacity, as the court 
presumed, and the court's asswnption, in that regard, as 
stated in the record, was clearly erroneous. 
Once that special or unusual circwnstances are 
found, the court may, in its discretion, order child support 
to age 2i. Section 15-2-1 U.C.A. Ferguson v. Ferguson, Utah 
578 P.2d 1274 (1978), Fletcher v. Fletcher, Utah 615 P.2d 
1218 (1980). 27 It is an abuse of discretion for the court to 
order child support, beyond the age of 18, unless it makes 
special findings concerning the need for such support. 
Fletcher v. Fletcher, supra. It was an abuse of discretion, 
in this case, not to permit any testimony about special or 
unusual circumstances that would have supported an award, be-
yond the age of 18, for Steven Jackman. 
Alimony 
The trial judge recited his understanding of the 
iaw of alimony, on the record, a number of times, always in 
. 
the following terms: 
27. If a son or daughter is incapacitated, cannot earn a 
living or is without sufficient means of self support, the 
c·ourt can order support for so long as any ·obligation to do 
so continues to exist under the law. The Uniform Civil Lia-
bility for Support Act, section 78-45, provides a parental 
obligation. of support for a son or daughter of any age, where 
the person is incapacitated and without means of self support. 
Kiesel v. Kiesel, Utah, 619 P.2d 1374 (1980). 
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and again, 
"THE COURT: In absence of personal £.Q!!.-
duct to the· contrary she's entitled to 
alimony. I'll tell you that right now. 
Twenty years, 22 years is enough to 
establish that" (R.195, emphasis supplied). 
. . 
11Q. MR. ALLRED: Now, what does it mean 
to say that you were a detail draftsman? 
"THE COURT: It really doesn't matter. She's 
entitled to alimony. I'll t.ell yo.u that, 
in absence of conduct that would cut her 
off of alimOily, and I'll asswne that that's 
not present in this case. You've laid 
sufficient grounds. 11 (R.213, emphasis sup-
plied.) 
Both of the foregoing recitals were early in the 
trial, before the defendant put on his own case. 
In English v. English, Utah, 565 P.2d 409 (1977) 
this court held that the purpose of alimony is to provide sup-
port for the wife. Alimony was not intended to reward the 
wife, or penalize her husband. In Gramme v. Gramme, Utah, 
587 P.2d 144 (1979), the defendant.'s attorney contended that 
he was entitled to put on evidence of plaintiff's misconduct, 
not only to establish grounds for divorce, but for the purpose 
of determining whether the plaintiff's right to alimony or 
marital property should be forfeited or reduced. The trial 
court ruled that when the parties had established grounds 
that entitled them to a divorce, that the degree of fault was 
of no further concern. This court, in the Gramme case, re-
stating the proposition that alimony was neither a penalty nor 
40 
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a reward, and affirming the trial court, stated that the 
£unction of alimony was to provide support for the wife as 
nearly as possible at the standard of living she enjoyed dur-
ing the marriage and to prevent her from becominq a public 
charge. Those principles were recently reasserted in 
Bushell v. Bushell, Utah, 649 P.2d·85 (1982). 
rt is perfectly clear that the trial court, in the 
instant case, assumed that the personal conduct of the plain-
tiff was a factor to be considered on the issue of alimony 
(R.195), and that misconduct could cut alimony off (R.213). 
Those propositions, which were applied by this court, as the 
law, until recently, made the personal conduct of the wife a 
factor to be considered, not only to establish grounds, but 
a~so to determine whether the plaintiff's right to alimony 
should be forfeited or reduced. The trial court's understanding 
of those points in this case, however, did not correctly re-
flect the law of the State of Utah at the time the case was 
tried. English v. English, supra at 411, Gramme v. Gramme, 
supra at 157. 
The award of alimony, in this case, was made by a 
judge who misunderstood the law and said so on the record. 
The alimony award was not based on the standard of 
living the plaintiff enjoyed, during the marriage, and con-
stituted an inequitable share of the defendant's historical 
earnings. The Decree left the plaintiff without health and 
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accident insurance, or the means to acquire it, and made it 
impossible for her to reconstruct her life on a happy and 
useful basis. 
While the court assumed, at the beginning of the 
case, that conduct that could cut off or reduce alimony was 
not present (R.213), it is not certain that the same assump-
tion was later indulged, after the defendant testified. This 
much is certain, the trial judge misunderstood the law and 
the alimony award was inadequate. 
The Division of Marital Assets 
During the foreshortened testimony of Hoyt S. Wimer, 
it became quite apparent there were serious conflicts between 
the testimony of Mr. Wimer and that of the defendant. At 
that time the court interrupted proceedings and said, 
"THE COURT: ... Maybe you have shown that 
he' s lied. Does. it make any difference even 
if. he'd have made a million dollars out of 
thes.e things. that you ' re going in to SO--much. 
I.sn 't the issue at this. time what--the need 
for aliiii'Ony and the ability to ~?And 
even if your contention is true, if he re-
ceives some benefit in the future out of it, . 
isn't that a basis for you to come in and 
ask for an increase in alimony? 11 (R.425,426, 
emphasis supplied) 
The trial court, as that recital shows, made no 
distinction between the plaintiff's claim for alimony and the 
plaintiff's claim to an equitable share of the assets acquired 
during the period of the marriage. The issue under discussion 
when the court interrupted counsel, on the record, at page 
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425, was not alimony. The court supposed that whatever the 
defendant had gotten out of those 11 things 11 the plaintiff had 
gone into "so much, .. and whatever he stood to acquire later,· 
was important to the plaintiff only in the. context of her 
need, in other words, on the· issue of alimony. Her recourse, 
if the defendant had made ~a million dollars, 11 according to 
the court, was to come back in and ask for an increase in 
alimony based on t•change of circumstancesjl (R.426,427). 
The trial court's response to the frustration of 
plaintiff's counsel, at that confusion, was to advise counsel 
to report the defendant to the Internal Revenue Service. 
They, he said, ffwill dig it up for youu (R.427). 
The award of alimony should not be included as a 
marital asset when the distribution of assets is made at the 
end of the case. Fletcher v. Fletcher, Utah, 615 P.2d 1218 
(1980). There is a distinction between the division of assets 
accumulated during the marri~ge, which are to be distributed 
upon an equitable basis, and the post marital duty of support 
and maintenance. English v. English, Utah, 565 P.2d 409 (1977) e 
The court confused the distinction between alimony 
and marital assets, and failed to differentiate between earn-
ings and proceeds received from the sale or distribution of 
assets. The court confused the distinction between a division 
of the marital estate and the duty of post marital support. 
The plaintiff's claim to one-half the cash value of the 
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defendant's interest in Future Development Company, and in 
the Bara projects, based on values established by the defend-
ant, was not a claim for alimony. 
It was cynical, unjust, and legally incorrect to 
suggest that it didn't matter if the defendant lied, even if 
he made a million dollars, because of it, as long as the 
plaintiff.got her alimony. Once the defendant had the interests 
that plaintiff's exhibits 10-P, 11-P and 15-P prove that he 
did, whether he had liquidated them, by the time the case was 
tried, and already received the proceeds, whether they were 
held, for him, by someone else, 28 to be received later, in 
some other way or through some other entity, or somehow other-
wise deferred, made no difference. The plaintiff was entitled 
to an equitable share of the assets acquired during the mar-
riage, whatever the defendant had done with them, without re-
gard to the defendant's additional duty to provide post marital 
support and maintenance. 
The trial court misunderstood and misapplied the 
law as it applied to child support, to alimony and the divi-
sion of assets. This court, considering all of that, should 
take appropriate corrective action. Watson v. Watson,. Utah, 
561 P.2d 1072 (1977). 
28. As in Boyce v. Boyce, Utah, 609 P.2d 928 (1980). 
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POINT V 
THE TRIAL JUDGE WAS NOT PREPARED TO TRY 
THE PLAINTIFF'S CASE 
The trial judge was not feeling-well when the 
plaintiff's case was tried. Although the written transcript 
cannot directly reflect that, it is nevertheless true. The 
judge ascended and left the Bench, slowly, in apparent pain. 
He frequently listened to the testimony with his eyes closed, 
shielded by his.hand, and with his head down. He seldom 
watched the witnesses, failed to start court on time, took a 
long break every hour and was extremely irritable. 
The judge read and examined complex exhibits, dur-
ing the trial, while the witnesses were being interrogated, 
and refused time and time again, to permit counsel to offer 
any explanation about the documents that were being admitted. 
The court's response to the plaintiff's efforts to put the 
exhibits in perspective, or e~lain them, was always, "The 
document speaks for itself 11 (R.327,328,372,410,421,438,465, 
466) • "I read them" he said, · .. as they come in. 1129 
2.9. The documents that were read while the witnesses were 
interrogated were not always understood. The discussion at 
R.437 and 438 makes the point. After reading plaintiff's 
exhibi.t 36-P, while ~. Wimer testified, the court concluded, 
out loud, that Mr. Jackman had personally guaranteed the 
construction loan on Future Development Company's North Salt 
Lake Project in March of 1980, but not the permanent loan in 
January of 1981. That conclusion was stated as follows: 
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There were times when the court refused to admit 
evidence to which no objection was nia.de (R.338). The judge 
made few notes, and had put the exhibits away, in the evidence 
room, long before the case was decided two months after the 
trial. The judge had to call counsel back, to clarify for-
gotten details, before he was able to rule on January 7, 1982 
(R.531-537). 
The plaintiff had important issues at stake in this 
litigation. Litigants should not be required to try lawsuits 
in front of judges who do not want to hear the evidence and 
don't feel good. While safeguarding the trial judge's repu-
tation is a vital co~sideration, one more important, certainly, 
than counsel's perception of his judicial performance, the 
matter involves, in the final analysis, the protection of the 
integrity of the public interest. 
"THE COURT: Well, the documents speak 
for themselves. The one he signed as a 
guarantor is a construction loan and this 
one he doesn't sign individually. It's 
on the trust deed. And he signs as an 
officer of the corporation. 0 (R.437) 
Only when plaint1ff 's counsel approached the bench, and 
pointed to the Guarantee on pages 5 and 6 of plaintiff's 
exhibit 36-P, did the court admit that Mr. Jackman personally 
guaranteed the permanent loan (R.438) . On other occasions 
during the interrogation of witnesses, the judge read complex 
exhibits, but said nothing. 
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POINT VI 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO 
AWARD THE PLAINTIFF REASONABLE ATTORNEY'S 
FEES 
At the time of the trial, the plaintiff had been 
home for 23 years (R.212). Mrs. Jackman, who had not been em-
ployed since 1958, testified she had lost her employment skills 
and the court agreed {R.213). The plaintiff totally depended 
upon the defendant for her own livelihood. When Mrs. Jack-
rnan' s attorney testified about his fees, he had already worked 
nearly 190 hours, and had advanced costs, for her, in the 
amount of $1,593.50. No part of the fees, and none of the 
costs, had then been paid. 
The trial court awarded $1,500.00 in attorney's fees 
(R.157); and $1,066.65, against the costs (R.171). 
Section 30-3-5 u.c.A. 1953 permits an award to the 
wife, or to a husband, of money with which to prosecute, or 
defend, an action in divorce. Such an award is particularly 
appropriate in those cases where the adverse party, usually 
the wife, is destitute or practically so. Such an award is 
also appropriate, in the sound discretion of the court, when 
the circumstances of the parties are such that in fairness to 
the wife, she should be given financial assistance by the 
husband in her prosecution or defense of the action. Weiss v. 
Weiss, 111 u. 353, 179 P.2d 1005. 
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Mrs. Jackman, at the time of the trial, was desti-
tute, or practically so, and unable to pay her attorney (R.250). 
The alimony awarded by the court was less than the plaintiff 
required to support herself and Steven Jackman. The financial 
circumstances of the parties have historically had an important 
bearing on issues relative to attorney's fees and court costs, 
and are critical in determining whether an award should be made. 
"The reason for permitting 2:. wife 
suit mo.nay to defend. an action for divor.ce 
rests Q!l the ground that the wife normally 
has lli2. s.eparate estate from which to ~ 
for bringing~ defending the action ... " 
Alldredge v. Alldredge 119 Utah 504, 229 P.2d 
681, emphasis supplied. 
The facts in this matter clearly support the award 
of reasonable attorney's fees to the plaintiff. This case 
required extensive discovery necessitated by the defendant's 
conduct. The failure to award reasonable fees, under the 
circumstances in this case, was so manifestly unjust and in-
equitable as to constitute an abuse of discretion. 
The court's refusal to award reasonable fees to 
Mrs. Jackman, or to others like her, ie extremely bad policy. 
What attorney will represent a wife with no income, ·or pros-
pects, one who knows nothing of her husband's financial af-
fairs, in an enormously difficult case like this one was, and 
in the way the facts require, if it is known in advance, that 
the fees will not be paid. 
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·POINT Vl:I 
THE PLAINTIFF SHOULD BE AWARDED HER 
ATTORNEY''S FEES AND COSTS FOR Tins APPEAL 
The decision below made this appeal necessary. If 
the judgment of the trial court is reversed, or even if it is 
not, the plaintiff should receive an adequate award for the 
services of her counsel in the lower court and for this appeal. 
·This court has held that reasonable attorney's fees may be 
awarded on appeal. Carter v. carter, Utah, 584 P.2d 904 (1978); 
Dahlberg v. Dahlberg 77 U. 157, 292 P. 214: Peterson v. Peterson 
112 U. 542, 189 P.2d 961; Hendricks v. Hendricks 91 U. 564, 
65 P.2d 642. 
CONCLUSION 
The plaintiff presented evidence intended to show 
that the defendant-respondent owned assets that were not dis-
closed in the parties' divorce proceedings. The trial court 
refused to permit the plaintiff to properly present her case, 
and found, in the face of overwhelming evidence to the con-
trary, that the defendant had never had an interest in Future 
Development company, in Bara Two Partnership· Limited, or the 
Bara Industrial Park. The trial court undervalued the defend-
ant's assets and income, asc~ibed no value to the defendant's 
appraisal business, divided the property inequitably, provided 
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insufficient alimony and no support for the parties' son, 
and refused.to award adequate attorney's fees. 
The evidence preponderated against the court's find-
ings of fact and the legal results that followed from them. 
When the evidence clearly preponderates against the trial 
-
court's findings, when the judgment so fails to do equity 
that it manifests a clear abuse of discretion, this court is 
authorized to make the necessary corrections. 
Counsel requests, if the matter must be remanded, 
that it be remanded to the trial calendar rather than the 
judge who handled the trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOEL M •. ALLRED 
500 American Savings Building 
61 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
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